Islands of Stability or Swamps of Insecurity?

MONUSCO’s Intervention Brigade and the Danger of Emerging Security Voids in eastern Congo

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2013 might enter into history as a turning point for both United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) two decades of armed conflicts. Both accustomed to negative reporting and daunting outlooks, they are similarly affected by a paradigm shift in international intervention that finds its precedent in MONUSCO, the Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation du Congo.

In resolution 2098 adopted on February 2013, the UN Security Council added considerable spice to a yet Chapter VII-mandated multidimensional peacekeeping operation, currently the largest of its kind. While core tasks of MONUSCO remained unchanged – protection of civilians and restoration of state authority – the so-called Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was invigorated to “neutralise all negative forces”, as non-state armed groups are usually called in diplomatic lingo.

What followed was the deployment of 3069 additional troops supplied by South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi – finalised in October 2013. Up to date, the FIB has engaged alongside increasingly belligerent and cohesive Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC, the national army) in defeating the mouvement du 23 mars (M23). The latter, a rebel army led by renegade commander Sultani Makenga came up as the central government’s main opponent in the chronically unstable Kivu provinces between April 2012 and October 2013. While preliminary success seems to accompany MONUSCO’s new approach and FARDC’s rejuvenation, the overall security situation has not visibly improved as over fifty different armed groups ranging from neatly structured militias to ragtag...
bandit gangs continue to operate across eastern DRC.\(^5\)

Instead of islands of stability, as the UN now suggests\(^6\), swamps of insecurity – in terms of overlapping and hybrid, non-state governance arrangements and disaggregated, negotiated oligopolies of violence – could be the result of the ongoing power reshufflings in eastern DRC\(^7\).

Upcoming military operations against groups such as Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are likely to pose huge challenges to both the FIB and FARDC.

**A COMPLEX TOPOGRAPHY OF CONFLICT AND GOVERNANCE**

With FARDC and MONUSCO targeting the meanwhile defeated M23, a myriad of other groups have been outside media attention. They vary in size (from dozens to thousands), alignment (pro- or anti-government), rationales (pragmatic vs. ideological), and structure (hierarchical vs. decentralised). M23 only represented one type in a broad scale of armed groups. Opposite in the spectrum are Mayi Mayi groups and the Raia Mutomboki, an umbrella term for decentralised self-defence groups founded to counter continuous threats by FDLR, last remnants of the Rwandan interahamwe, or groups such as RCD and CNDP, predecessors of M23.\(^8\) Other big groups include Nyatura or APCLS.\(^9\)

Most groups vary in diffusion and relevance, such as in the use of social, political, and economic capital. Stimulated by state neglect and opposition among each other as well as against parts of the government army, most groups create their own micro-units in which governance is exerted beyond or in spite of classic ‘state rule’. The blending of militarised and civilian spheres at local levels makes it difficult to discover not only the way the Congolese state is contested but also how it is reproduced in eastern DRC’s everyday life. In addition, most non-state armed groups engage in fine- branched cohabitation and collaboration networks – some durable, others quickly untied or reshaped. Individual commanders within FARDC and political or economic elites are vital in these networks as the UN Group of Experts revealed for the case of General Amisi\(^10\).

Bigmen, acting as “rebels in suits”, use their clout to either sponsor militias or bolster stray army units for the own ends\(^11\).

Against this background it appears hard to believe that MONUSCO’s emboldened mandate and setup will turn out as a silver bullet for more than two decades of complex and multilayered

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\(^5\) Vogel, Christoph (2013): Mapping Armed Groups in eastern Congo, at www.christophvogel.net/mapping.

\(^6\) MONUSCO concept paper on ‘islands of stability’, on file with the author.


\(^8\) The Rassemblement des Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD, split into RCD-Goma, RCD-Kisangani, and RCD-National) and the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) are rebel armies that notwithstanding their own political agenda also to some extent operated as proxy forces of the Rwandan government around 2000 and from 2006–2009 respectively.


competition in a geographically challenging area. While the latter is key to the peacekeeping mission’s weakness in protecting civilians, FARDC’s role in these interwoven power struggles poses a paradoxical challenge to the UN’s task of restoring state authority: the army is just one of the many abusive forces in the area. This multiplies yet inherent political and operational impediments typical to each integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping mission. Nonetheless, the ‘community of fate’ between FARDC and MONUSCO has been successful since General François Olenga and Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Martin Kobler took over the lead, respectively.

**Factors for Recent FARDC Successes**

Without doubt, MONUSCO’s changed character has been vital to what has been observed as a massive shift from ineptitude to assertiveness in FARDC’s performance between November 2012 (when M23 almost by default captured Goma) and July 2013 (when commando and rapid response units initiated a series of military successes before the doors of North Kivu’s provincial capital). Earlier mentioned factors, i.e. the sacking and sidelining of certain individuals and the re-assignment of key posts in North Kivu’s military region have played a crucial role. In addition, improved supply lines (both through MONUSCO and own FARDC channels) have contributed to a boost in morale among combatants, yet amplified by increasing popular support, in particular directed to Col. Mamadou Ndala, the army’s operational commander in North Kivu, whose death near Beni on 2 January 2014 (probably by other FARDC elements) could have a wider impact. All that was additionally fostered by the fact that M23 largely failed in attracting the populations’ sympathy.

Beyond missing civilian support, a few other weaknesses of M23 have surfaced from early 2013. Most notably, February’s internecine fighting between the kifuafua (Sultani Makenga) and kimbelembele (Bosco Ntaganda) factions made up for large troop losses on the side of Makenga who emerged as new and old military leader of the group afterwards. At the same time, there was increasing international pressure – sparked by a controversial report in which the UN Group of Experts detailed the pervasiveness of Rwandan and Ugandan support to M23. Regardless whether these accusations are true or false, they caused an unprecedented amount of critique and asset freezing, which in turn is likely to have influenced policy in DRC’s neighbour states in one way or another.

While it is unclear if and how Rwanda had helped M23 before, the current events suggest such support had completely waned by mid-2013. Not only did the post-split M23 leadership have strained relations with Kigali, but also ties between the communities M23 claims to represent have somewhat soured over time. This is the case for M23’s operational commander, Sultani Makenga. His wing of M23 is even alleged to have linked up with Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, a dissident general and opposition figure. All this made for a tense position out of which the leadership around Makenga and Bertrand Bisimwa, the


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13 Bosco Ntaganda, a former UPC commander, CNDP leader, and FARDC general is a tipping point in the emergence of M23. Meanwhile he surrendered to the US embassy in Kigali and has been transferred to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

14 M23 mostly represents rwandophone people such as Banyabwisha and Banyajomba, while South Kivu’s Banyamulenge never supported the rebellion. While much of M23’s military leadership is made up of ‘Congolese Tutsi’, it is simplistic to speak of an ethnic rebellion given the implication of other communities and the clan system that partly contradicts the colonial-racist ethnicity cleavage paradigm.
movement’s political head, could not create a position of strength similar to that of CNDP around 2008.\footnote{See Stearns, Jason (2012b): From CNDP to M23. The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo. Usalama Project Report. Rift Valley Institute, London/Nairobi.}

The use of proxies has also helped FARDC: While government-aligned militias served as buffer, they increased security issues on the side of M23. Main ‘troop contributors’ to the Kinshasa side have been APCLS, Nyatura (these cases include a few more or less officially integrated battalions), and a few smaller militias. While FDLR cohabitation and collaboration with FARDC happened in several cases, there has not been enough reliable confirmation of them fighting alongside FARDC troops such as M23 press releases suggested. Coupled with improvements from within, the aforementioned external factors have eminently contributed to FARDC’s reincarnation as a real army. This observation, however, is tightly linked to the M23-complex. A combination of nationalist-xenophobic feelings against perceived invasion and asymmetric local support networks (which M23 lacked throughout its existence) brought along this shift in the long run. Dealing with other ‘negative forces’ and addressing the massive need of further reform will require a far more elaborated set of measures and policies.

**MONUSCO: From toothless tiger to...?**

Not expected by everyone, the FIB performed much better than forecast. During the process of deployment some units already got implicated in fighting as FARDC attacked M23 around Kibumba in August 2013. The robust approach employed by Tanzanian and South African peacekeepers, the latter partly acting as snipers to kill M23 officers, balanced a bumpy start when a ‘security zone’ was declared by the humanitarian coordinator – at that time acting SRSG – that actually did not involve any militias anyways. Shortly after though, concrete action and concomitant leadership language and manners\footnote{Personified by SRSG Kobler, Force Commander Lt.-Gen. dos Santos Cruz, and FIB Commander Brig.-Gen. Mwikibolwa.} enhanced MONUSCO’s capacity as a deterrent, if not more than that.\footnote{For a critical comparative analysis of MONUC/MONUSCO’s historical performance, see Tull, Dennis M. (2009): Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Waging Peace and Fighting War, in: International Peacekeeping, Vol.16, No. 2, pp. 215–230.}

Reports have detailed to which extent the FIB has been implicated with ground and aerial assets in the advances against M23 positions, in particular in October 2013.\footnote{For a detailed reports, see Darren Olivier’s analysis at http://www.africandefence.net/analysis-how-m23-was-rolled-back/} While this is a comparable success story, it should not be misinterpreted as a fast-selling trend either. The exclusive concentration on M23 has helped the FIB a big deal in acting in a focused and determined fashion. Although the mandate stipulates engagement with all groups the so-called intervention brigade, in its current shape and setup, neither has the military capacity nor the logistic means to tackle all armed groups at the same time. Whether or not this new form of UN peacekeeping can achieve lasting success thus depends on how effectively it can engage with groups such as FDLR, ADF, NDC Sheka, Raia Mutomboki, or others. Given that some of these employ particularly asymmetrical tactics and dispose over modus operandi which are hard to calculate, it is not only difficult to find and fight them but also to actually clarify who is a combatant and who not. MONUSCO’s imperative with regards to civilian protection makes the FIB’s tasks a ride on a thin line.

**ISLANDS OF STABILITY OR SWAMPS OF INSECURITY?**

Adapted from other contexts, a specific terminology began to dominate MONUSCO
strategy papers as the FIB started actual operations: the idea of establishing so-called ‘islands of stability’ in eastern DRC has gained currency under the mission’s new head Martin Kobler:

The overall objective of the “Islands of Stability” is to prevent an immediate relapse of the communities concerned into a cycle of violence after armed groups have freed an area – either due to successful FIB and/or FARDC clearing operations or negotiations with armed groups, through an integrated – multi-dimensional and multi-stakeholders, holistic but targeted 6-month initial response.  

Embedded in and placed between the current UN Security Council resolution, the Peace Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF, ‘11+4’ or ‘Addis Agreement’) and the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Mary Robinson’s ‘Framework of Hope’, such islands shall be established across eastern DRC. In a somehow ‘shape-clear-hold-build’ logic, MONUSCO (primordially the FIB with FARDC) wants to regain authority – with and for the DRC government – over increasing parts of the Kivu provinces. This is risky for a whole set of reasons, both the political and operational side of the ‘COIN’.

Starting with the political implications, the notion of islands strongly refers to a segregation of priorities. While some areas will be considered important, or strategic, others in reverse will be neglected. It is hard to believe that zones already neglected by MONUSCO and FARDC before will all of a sudden become focus areas. Obviously, MONUSCO’s perception in these zones could become seriously jeopardised in consequence, such as that of UN and non-UN humanitarian actors often assimilated. Then, an impression of l’Afrique utile obtrudes itself upon the islands concept. More concretely, the post-colonial grip over DRC might be reasserted in a structural way as islands of stability could turn into the mere reproduction of metropolis-periphery relations and ossify yet existing divides between remote and connected places. Moreover, a parallelism to existing efforts in the field of mining governance (mainly targeting the formalisation of artisanal, informal production modes through monopolist, closed-pipeline schemes) is obvious and reinforces exactly this tendency.

The further political danger connected to the establishment of islands of stability is the concomitant perpetuation of areas of instability, more provocatively termed as swamps of insecurity. Wherever there is an island – be it at the shores of Somalia or at the margins between Walikale and Shabunda – the surrounding areas are likely to lack stability as opposed to the island. More than a decade of UN peacekeeping presence, mediocre DDR programmes, and misled army reform (mixage, brassage, and regimentation) overtly indicate how insecurity and imbalances in security provision create tensions and security voids on local levels. The availability of weaponry and ammunition can be conducive in helping self-defence groups to emerge, which will eventually turn into full-fledged militias later.

Years of subsequent UN Security Council resolutions since 2008 have drawn MONUSCO into a ‘community of fate’ with the DRC government. In turn, reality in eastern Congo...
features daily contest of this government, reconfiguration of authority, reinvention of norms, overlapping modes of governance, and multiple sources of legitimization. MONUSCO’s mandate does not capture this complexity. The notion of ‘islands of stability’ can exacerbate this mismatch and enforce dominant narratives about the Congolese conflicts. By definition, it draws from an orthodox idea of statehood and governance that does not take into account more fluid geographical and social dynamics.

Operationally, MONUSCO’s capacity is difficult to assess given the recent nature of the FIB. Before the latter has entered the field, the mission has had serious constraints in terms of staffing the necessary number of bases in areas defined as ‘must- and should-protect’ in its internal communication. Despite already 17,000 troops on the ground, the mission dramatically lacked manpower and logistics to cover the vastness of the conflict areas. Numbering 20,000 meanwhile, and with an impending further shift of personnel to the eastern parts of DRC, there is a fair amount of hope that prevailing capacity problems can be addressed. Still, this is by no means a panacea to increase security and protection overall. Establishing islands of stability requires military follow-up after securing an area, i.e. disarming one or several militias that used to control a given area before.

A ‘clear-hold-shape-build’ approach requires massive resources and reliable national partners as the case of Afghanistan (although hardly comparable with DRC otherwise) tells. While the US army and its allies struggle despite 84,271 soldiers – roughly four times as many than MONUSCO – Afghan security forces show a mixed performance in providing security. Recent experiences of violence and plunder within FARDC indicate that at least some units are barely behaving better than blueprint militia groups. However, the FARDC – and the Congolese police – would be of crucial importance to implement such an approach.

However, this remains another casse-tête. Despite improvements in recent months overall security sector reform (SSR) as a cornerstone of effective and reliable defence institutions continues to depend on political willingness of the Congolese government. However much MONUSCO or other stakeholders have pushed for further steps in this regard, the current state of the art shows wide arrays for further improvement – only the so-called bancarisation can be regarded mostly as a success story so far. Ongoing military trials bring along a glimmer of hope that impunity will decrease. MONUSCO will sooner or later depend on FARDC to take over security provision in certain areas. Whether ill-disciplined army units will be sidelined or not can be determining for such takeovers. Also, this appears little realistic for a few reasons: The current shape of the Congolese army indicates a three-pronged structure: While the foreign-trained elite units (referred to as ‘unités de reaction rapide/URR) and the Republican Guards (similarly elite units, but specifically trained for serving the presidency) are at least in parts excellent military, the bulk of ‘normal’ FARDC is unlikely to be a prime provider of

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24 MONUSCO internal report on ‘protection matrix’, on file with the author.
26 Aiming at the establishment of electronic salary payment within FARDC, the bancarisation has been fostered by international donors and supported by EUSEC, the EU’s SSR-oriented civil-military mission to the DRC.
security over large areas. Secondly, internal turf wars are heightening within the FARDC command structure. The killing of Col. Mamadou Ndala, operational commander of the URR operations against M23, is a clear indication that shows how tense relations between i.e. the Republican Guard and the URR units are. Moreover, the case of Mamadou is emblematic for another rift in the army, possibly pitting the Commander of Land Forces and the Army Chief of Staff against each other.

The example of Raia Mutomboki gives a casebook example on how long-term obstacles for external peacekeeping might be framed. Loosely organised, this franchise-like militia is an outlier in the landscape of armed groups in eastern DRC. Raia Mutomboki, as a rather recent wave of armed insurrection, is illustrative to the idea of incertitude that ignites armed conflict in the area: Born in response to FDLR assaults, the label has resurged in a context of ill-guided FARDC policies, including the regimentation process. In this approach, the DRC had tried to catch up with some of the shortcomings of previous integration of former armed groups into the national army. However, the regimentation process led to a situation whereby whole areas were, at least temporarily, abandoned by the army, increased insecurity being the result. In sequence, the emergence of Raia Mutomboki as a popular defence force has been additionally boosted. Meanwhile, many Raia Mutomboki are on the brink of being captured by professional revolutionaries while still recruiting and mobilising on a very local basis. While some of them are, since M23’s demise, playing the demobilisation card the underlying security issues remain unsolved. Setting up islands of stability in their Shabunda strongholds will obviously either turn out into the mere securitisation of urban areas or demand massive additional investments in local-level peacebuilding.

**Et alors…?**

The emergence and persistence of local security voids remains a characteristic of eastern Congo. While MONUSCO has silenced traditional critiques against their agony by massively intervening in the fight against M23, questions over its operational capacities and political partiality are undeniable. So far, the establishment of ‘islands of stability’ appears to be a new logo for a yet existing approach: Securing militarily strategic zones plus those rated as ‘must-protect’.

In the long run, this will reinforce the swamps of insecurity floating around the centres. This is not MONUSCO’s fault, despite being the UN’s largest peacekeeping mission it is wishful thinking to pacify a vast inaccessible place like eastern Congo. Policymakers in New York and in key donor capitals need to understand that neither with nor without the FIB, the capacities of MONUSCO will be sufficient for a forceful overall military victory. Any long-term solution will be political. Given the plethora of rival powerbrokers across eastern DRC it is also unlikely that complete state authority can be restored anytime soon – even if President Kabila announced this in his address to

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29. In the so-called mixage and brassage processes, armed groups had to be integrated into FARDC while their internal chains of command and their local embeddedness, i.e. in mining areas, was to be broken up. Seen from now, these processes largely turned out as failures, as they helped some influential ex-rebel and FARDC commanders to tighten their grip on certain commercial activities.

the nation pursuant to M23’s retreat. The resulting question is, what alternatives are on the table?

One of the approaches, slowly becoming an evergreen in diplomatic discussion in and on the DRC, consists in holding local elections. The neglect of rural and remote areas in eastern Congo has not only resulted in precarious security dynamics as shown above, it had evenly dismantled popular trust in the political system. Contrary to what has been erroneously argued by commentators such as J. Peter Pham or Jeffrey Herbst, the Congolese state is not inexistent beyond the major urban centres. It has developed into a twilight-styled construction that has forced main parts of the population to either accept predation or to find creative strategies to play according to the existing, often violent modes of social interaction. Local elections can, but only if held in an accountable manner, help restoring trust in the form of a new social contract between the state and its citizens. However, whether they will be executed remains a big question mark at this point.

MONUSCO and FARDC are now starting military operations against FDLR and ADF. But the mission, and the international community, must also increase commitment to processes where they can make a difference. Implicating dozens of militias, the conflicts will not be terminated by the brigade and its fixed temporal mandate. The UN need to develop enough clout to force all conflict actors to negotiations more credible than the Kampala Talks or Sun City years before. They need to set up a thorough strategy to boost the new disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programme just adopted by Congolese government. As much as ‘islands of stability’ may not tackle the ‘swamps of insecurity’, the Congolese government may not have the breath to stem large-scale DDR alone. Such efforts, though, need to avoid past failures and be aware of prevailing networks of patronage that span from the national to the local levels. The latter had led to a situation whereby both government-led and international DDR initiatives were marred by distortion and a striking lack of follow-up in terms of sustainable social reintegration.

Massive targeted international funding and joint oversight can help. However, stakeholders must be aware of the need to simultaneously address contingent conflict actors (thereby neutralising not armed groups in the first place but rather the security dilemmas in between the former) and put a particular emphasis on social and economic reintegration of demobilised combatants. These two points have been at the core of past failures, but policies of exempting so-called pyromanes-pompiers from sanctions as well as the strategy of buying off commanders and thus rewarding rebellion need to be stopped.31 If this guides new joint efforts on DDR, prospect may be brighter than in the recent past.

With already more than demobilized 2500 combatants (and wide over 3000 dependents) from over twenty armed groups cantoned in Bweremana, North Kivu,32 it is high time for the Congolese government and its international partners to kick-start reinsertion and reintegration measures. Should this not happen anytime soon, the demobilized will – as in many preceding examples – regain the forests and those still there will not even be willing to come out.

32 Confidential documents on file with the author.
REFERENCES


groups in the eastern DR Congo. Amani Itakuya Essay Series #08, at:

