Conference Summary

Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa: Implementing the New Africa-EU Partnership

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Summary

While the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) have collaborated on traditional forms of hard security they need to look at issues of human security and address underlying causes of conflict. The complexity of African states and security threats in Africa must be properly appreciated if their responses are to be effective, yet there is still a tendency in some quarters to view Africa though a single lens. Much focus is given to how Europe can help Africa but there are important lessons for Europe to take from Africa. In some respects the AU has made greater progress than the EU in establishing continent wide security structures, and as one speaker remarked it was only in 1993 that Kenyan troops were serving and dying in Sarajevo to help stabilise Europe.

The divergence between the rhetoric of an equal partnership between Africa and the EU and the reality is something that should be recognised. There have been positive developments since the 2000 summit in Cairo, where many African leaders felt they were simply taking part in a photo-opportunity with their European counterparts. The Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) is a sign of this more serious commitment to collaboration. However while the relationship remains dominated by the donor recipient dynamic the question of ownership will remain extremely difficult. This theme arose on multiple occasions during the conference and is something that the upcoming summit should be aware of.

On a broader level it is doubtful that ownership can exist in many places in Africa where predatory elites have seized control of the state, indeed in these situations efforts to bring real peace and security can serve to undermine leaderships. It is worth examining if peace and security initiatives by the AU or the EU can ever hope to be truly successful if their focus is on the symptoms rather than the underlying causes of the problems. In case studies looking at the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Somalia the point was made that security support to governments can be counterproductive. Somali troops trained in Uganda by the EU have been reported as switching sides on their return to Mogadishu, without an effective government to work for, and be paid by, the newly trained troops have little motivation to fight on behalf of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Some speakers suggested that the government in Kinshasa had an interest in the failure of Security Sector Reform (SSR) missions in DRC.

The motivations for European engagement in Africa are further reaching than rhetoric in public statements would suggest. EU missions to DRC in 2003 and Chad in 2007 had as much to do with proving the relevance of Europe as a
global player capable of projecting influence as with desires to help states affected by conflict, especially in the aftermath of the Iraq war and the opposition from France and Germany. Many speakers posited that one of Europe’s primary security concerns from Africa is migration and expressed the desire that dialogue should be honest about respective motivations. A further important element to understand on the side of the EU is the central importance of a ‘lead nation’, without the political push from a leading European capital missions are unlikely to happen. This may mean that at times EU missions are serving national interest but as the former commander of the EU force in Chad/Central African Republic (CAR) observed this can be vitally important when obstacles need to be overcome.

Much progress had been achieved in improving peace and security in Africa given limited time and resources. However there was recognition of much work still to be done. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is able to raise 80% of its budget internally and is seen as the most effective regional body in addressing Peace and Security. It is only when Africa is itself able to pay for missions that there can be true independence of action. Ownership of peace and security initiatives will likewise only exist when states are paying for them themselves. The AU values the EU contribution to support its peace and security efforts but as long as funding is not predictable, sustainable and flexible the AU and regional organisations are likely to be less than fully effective. Achieving a more equal partnership will be greatly facilitated by more sustainable funding arrangements. Coherence between different actors was also highlighted as something that needed attention. Multiple SSR missions in DRC for example do not in the end help reform if they are not properly coordinated.

The Africa-Europe relationship does not exist in a vacuum and nor is it the only relationship that each continent has. On the side of Europe, Afghanistan is absorbing military resources and political focus and in the light of budget restrictions and defence cuts it seems that at least in the short term the appetite for direct European engagement on land in Africa will be limited. The AU has a longstanding relationship with the United Nations and the AU is seeking a means to benefit from UN assessed contributions for missions it carries out under UN mandate, however the Security Council is reluctant to consider this proposal. The conference heard how increasingly China is having to calibrate its approach with African concerns around governance and human rights.

The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa play a central role in the implementation of peace and security initiatives on the continent. There is
an evolving and generally improving relationship between the REC's and the African Union although between REC's there is some way to go. In many regions leadership is provided by stronger more capable states and often times this has been very fruitful although there can be political problems when neighbours seek to impose ideas on each other. It is also important to note the difference in progress by various regional bodies. This is especially true concerning North Africa which despite greater financial and military resources lags far behind other regions in the development of their regional security mechanisms. Some participants attributed this lack of engagement to the fact that North Africa aligns its priorities north to Europe or east towards the Middle East. In this context engagement with the rest of Africa is primarily useful when blocks of votes are necessary.

The conference underlined the paramount importance of understanding the political context if peace and security initiatives are to be successful. This is true at the level of EU-Africa continental relations as well as at the operational level of individual AU, REC, EU or UN missions. Without a clear understanding of the political context efforts are unlikely to be successful. Peace and Security do not exist in isolation from issues of governance and human rights and the evolving African Governance Architecture seeks to address some of these underlying causes of conflict and will be as important as the kinetic instruments in ensuring widening and lasting peace.
Session 1: Understanding the purpose of peace and security initiatives

Chair: Jeremy Astill-Brown, Africa Programme Associate Fellow, Chatham House

Funmi Olonisakin, Senior Research Fellow, Conflict Security and Development Group, King’s College London

Only partial success can be expected from the AU-EU partnership. There is a major structural, conceptual and strategic gap of political challenges and differences. It is necessary to be honest and address the challenges and interests of both sides. The ideas underpinning the strategy are progressive: that Africa should be treated as one, and that peace and security should become a priority. But there is a serious political challenge in that the Africa-EU partnership is an unequal one, a donor-receiver relationship. The capacity that both sides have to analyse peace and security issues is very different, and there is considerable divergence in capacity within Africa. Agreements are therefore bound to be skewed.

Europe’s language is one of liberalism and even idealism, it supposes that Europe can project its core values to another continent. However, it is necessary to accept that Europe’s actions reek of a realism. The two continents have conflicting agendas when it comes to issues of threats and security. In Africa threats to security are at a state level whereas human security is often disregarded. It is necessary to not create a false dichotomy where there is a perceived need to decide whether to pursue one type of security over the other; if you are not secure as a state, you cannot make your people secure.

Neither national security nor human security exists in most African countries. The core of insecurity in Africa is deliberate: those sitting around the negotiating table are the ‘predatory elite’, state actors who will act in their own elite interests and exclude their own populations. There is a great difference between the concerns of the two regions. European countries are dealing with high stake issues, like terrorism. That is not what is at the forefront of Africans’ minds. Another main European interest is cross-border issues, especially migration, and Europe therefore needs to be honest and say so. African leaders who have occupied the space of the state at the expense of their people, will acquiesce to that unbalanced agenda because it delivers a fait accompli and keeps them in power as legitimate state actors. There is a structural gap because the real issues are not being addressed.
The EU-Africa partnership is of limited relevance to the African people. In peace and security, there is little engagement with the root causes which leads to a structural gap. This would require challenging the predatory elites. Politically, Europeans cannot do that because they need the elites to fulfil their own agenda. Peace support operations have delivered some of the good results. The threats of the 1990s like large-scale armed conflicts are decreasing. But they haven’t disappeared and Africa is left with low-intensity conflict.

The question is, what should the focus be on? There needs to be a shift in focus from strictly military concerns to cover structural violence and real security for people. This means doing a lot of difficult political work, and Europe will have to ask itself some difficult questions, about whether this is about idealism, liberalism, or realism. Once they have determined their real interests, they should put them on the table and negotiate from that basis.

**Ben Shepherd David Davies of Llandinam Fellow, Department of International Relations, London School of Economics**

It is important to avoid a purely technical discussion about processes into which the debate on institutional cooperative partnerships often slides. It is important to acknowledge that the issues being discussed are fundamentally political, as the EU and AU are inevitably political organizations. Questions from both the functional perspective, and from other ground-up political and social perspectives need to be considered.

Secondly, it is important to ask whose peace and security is being talked about since this differs greatly for Europeans and for Africans, and whether the issue is human security or hard security. Europe often seems to want to solve problems without committing the resources and considers it sufficient to conduct meetings and create institutions without evaluating their impact. All too often when cooperation hits a brick wall, participants declare that there is no political will. This explanation, however, is useless and it would be worthwhile to look into the underlying issues connected to the question of why the EU is engaged in Africa.

Thirdly, in order for dialogue and partnership to be deepened there needs to be a basic level of honesty in order to achieve successful outcomes. Fourthly, there is an element of theatricality involved in international politics. Politicians sit at high-level roundtables and conferences but everyone knows that these aren’t the real conversations and that often, nothing at all will change. Lastly, there is a question of dilemmas. Approaches to peace and security are often
couched in a liberal framework where actors seek to do everything at the same time. There may, however, be dilemmas, or conflicts, in relation to the sequencing of the agendas, such as between human rights and security, or between conflict and democracy. How these agendas are balanced is something that is worth putting on the table early.

_**Eleonora Koeb, Policy Officer, European Centre for Development Policy Management**_

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) needs to be seen in the context of the African Governance Architecture and goes beyond the African Standby Force. EU support should go beyond funding and should cover support for capacity and institution building in the AU. Key to a new model of cooperation is the political recognition of AU leadership, for instance in the context of conflict prevention, where it is very successful. Governance issues should be addressed by the AU as well as by regional economic committees.

The AU summit in January on the topic of Shared Values worked towards the implementation and operationalisation of the African Governance Architecture. The difficult question is whether the EU can synchronise with some of the AU’s most important policies, for instance with the policy on unconstitutional changes in government. The EU tends to deal with issues on a case-by-case basis rather than taking a standardised approach.

In the political dialogue the EU and Africa may have moved too quickly without having clarified historical issues. Both sides are forced to prioritise and therefore reach weak compromises rather than working with shared values.

There has been a far more comprehensive approach to the APSA than is reflected in those documents that focus only on military aspects. The political fundamentals need to be addressed with more honesty in order to establish shared values. The most important imperative is to ‘do no harm’ and not to undermine African ownership.

**Q&A**

Participants responded to the presentations with questions that asked if the dialogue was really a dialogue of the deaf, and if the inequality between Europe and Africa meant that the concept of ownership should be questioned. The conference was also reminded that civil society has an important role to play in these discussions and that the whole picture is more positive. The
difficulty of Africa presenting a common position for 53 states with different identities was highlighted although participants did raise the fact that there should be things Europe can learn from Africa and the traffic does not need to be one way. It was observed that maritime security was a neglected area that might offer fundraising opportunities for Africa. It was observed that while the 2000 Cairo summit had appeared to be about a photo opportunity for European leaders, African insistence on a more sustainable relationship had helped to move the relationship in a more meaningful direction, even while in some areas such as the ICC the partners were not able to agree.

**Ben Shepherd:** There is no comprehensive understanding of Africa, it is either equated with terrorism or seen as a scar on the conscience of the world. It will be a dialogue of the deaf until there is a more nuanced perspective of reality. This is not a one-way power relationship and European politics need to demonstrate that. It is necessary to be honest about EU interests and this will be the way to overcome inequality.

**Funmi Olonisakin:** The EU and the AU are fundamentally different in origin. While the EU was allowed to grow organically, the AU leaped forward from the Organisation of African Unity. The AU does not have the same clarity of direction as the EU and therefore finds it difficult to act collectively. There is always an owner but it can never be the less equal partner. In Africa, those who can claim ownership are a small number, not the continent as a whole. There is no African ownership because it is difficult to own what you have not paid for. Maritime security is on the agenda but for the wrong reasons. If the issue is actually piracy, then let’s call it piracy.

**Eleonora Koeb:** In the discourse of interests, there is a hybridity between realist and idealist legitimacy of the EU and the AU. The EU has its issues too, regarding the Lisbon Treaty and regarding the question of whether it is burden-shifting or burden-sharing. It is possible to accept the legitimacy of an organisation while still recognising its limitations. It is necessary to accept the added value of the AU and the EU in representing and advancing European interests on migration, for example. The framework has the potential to open up dialogue, even if neither side has so far been making use of that. The Joint Strategy is a framework that allows Africa to take ownership of part of the process. Of course there should be mutual learning from one another and the political dialogue of issues from both sides can be useful for Europe. There is a draft declaration already in place regarding maritime security. It is not a good idea.
Ambassador John K. Shinkaiye: Piracy needs to be fought on the ground not at sea. Europe and Africa have different approaches to piracy: while Europe usually pays a ransom, Africa refuses to pay. In maritime security, illegal fishing and toxic dumping are the main issues.
Session 2: Case Study - EU Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau and EU Security Sector Reform in Democratic Republic of the Congo

Chair: Dr Martin Rupiya, Executive Director, African Public Policy and Research Institute

Ambassador Joseph Mutaboba, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Guinea Bissau

A census carried out with the support of the EU mission was instrumental in establishing a clear picture of the armed forces and Ambassador Mutaboba emphasised the positive work done by the EU on the establishment of the pension fund for elements of the Guinea Bissau armed forces. The EU SSR mission assisted in the drafting and adoption of the legal frameworks for the defence and security structures to respect republican values and be responsive to the threats and capacities of Guinea Bissau. Unfortunately, these threats have not been assessed yet, meaning that there is a gap done in the work so far.

The UN took the decision in 2009 to strengthen its capacities in Guinea Bissau, establishing an integrated mission on 1st January 2010. The SSR unit is the largest substantive component of United Nations Peace-Building Support Office In Guinea-Bissau and it represents its operational arm on the ground. The UN office is mandated to coordinate actions of partners, in particular, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS), the EU and the Community of Portuguese speaking Countries (CPLP), for assistance in the area of SSR. It is important to highlight the nascent partnership between ECOWAS and the CPLP in providing security for state institutions.

Developments of the 1st April 2010 created a situation that led EU member states to decide not to continue with the SSR mission in Guinea Bissau, and it closed on 30th September 2010. The SRSG emphasised this decision was not based on developments pertaining to the work of the mission, but rather on political developments in the country. The UN has undertaken to build upon the EU legacy, meaning that reforms in the areas of defence, security and justice as well as governance of the security sector should be carried out coherently and in an inclusive manner. Reforming the sectors simultaneously will ensure sustainability of the reforms and solidify new structures. The EU position should not be viewed as a decision to disengage from SSR in Guinea Bissau. Ambassador Mutaboba was confident that the EU will continue to
support SSR to Guinea Bissau, remaining one of the main international partners.

This is a country with very limited resources where duplication of tasks and conflicting mandates of divided security forces leads to problems of jurisdiction and creates additional financial burdens. SSR is a long and difficult process and there is an obligation to better manage expectations, nationally and internationally. Although support for national ownership is now an uncontested aspect of international engagement, it is very difficult to achieve in practice. When national ownership and capacities are particularly weak, international coordination and coherence becomes even more critical to ensuring effective reform. International partners must work towards common objectives and speak with one voice with national partners. Furthermore SSR reforms can only be achieved with concrete financial support from international partners. Existing funding gaps persistently constrain the proper implementation of programmes.

**Hans Hoebeke, Senior Research Fellow, Central Africa Programme, Egmont Institute**

From 1996-2003, the DRC experienced two very destructive wars creating a major crisis in African continental security. In the early part of 2000 the EU stepped up its engagement, this was also the moment when the EU started to develop its international role, and its role as an actor in peace and security. The EU began working in the DRC as much to test its instruments of peace and security in an operational context as to stabilize the country.

The first EU military mission was ARTEMIS in 2003, a French initiative taken over by the EU. It was a means to demonstrate that the EU was capable of sending military forces to Africa to act in support of the UN. It was not insignificant that it happened at the same time as the invasion in Iraq. In 2006 the EU sent another force, EUFOR-Kinshasa to protect the elections of that year. In 2005, the EC set up a scheme to train an integrated police unit in DRC which was accompanied by the EUPOL mission. This turned into an SSR mission but was initially a capacity building mission for a police unit in Kinshasa, a unit disbanded immediately after the elections. Very soon after setting up EUPOL the EU set up EUSEC, a mission to help the Congolese in setting up their own reform processes. Accompanying that, from 2004-10 the EU also had a rule of law mission in eastern DRC following on from ARTEMIS. So there was a quite comprehensive EU strategy which although not perfect, demonstrated a flexibility and willingness to invest and engage in
peace and security in DRC; looking increasingly at SSR as the key to enabling functioning institutions and stability in the DRC.

A lot of EU countries have bilateral programmes in the field, yet coordination between them has been almost non-existent. Often there has been competition and distrust between them in pursuing their SSR projects. Hans also spoke of human resource problems creating dysfunctional missions.

At that time the Congolese government saw advantages of working with the international community and at least following the discourse that they needed some kind of SSR. This changed after 2006. The EU and World Bank co-authored a governance compact that was added to the first post-elections government programme. It was very detailed on SSR but it completely disappeared. So from 2006 onwards, the EU, UN and other partners have been incapable of having a meaningful discussion on SSR with the DRC, reflecting the lack of political will of the DRC government towards human security and basic service delivery.

The EU had a strong sense of purpose before 2006 but since then has been struggling to maintain a relationship with the Congolese government, especially EUSEC and EUPOL which the EU had hoped to turn into a coordination mechanism for international engagement in SSR. The Congolese government made it very clear that they would rather those missions left. This is still the case and it is not only the EU but MONUC and MONUSCO are also continually on the defensive and are not being allowed to coordinate SSR.

2011 will be an electoral year and the EU has informally committed money to help the elections. From an EU perspective having this in place is a guarantee that some form of institutions will be in place for the elections. The EU may be too afraid to face the fact that its SSR policy of the last four years has been wasted. This is not really the fault of the EU; a lack of ownership, willingness and interest by the Congolese government to engage in any form of dialogue on governance reform on SSR, and in a way more dramatically, an unwillingness of EU member states to coordinate their own efforts in the DRC have undermined their efforts.

There is growing frustration at the international level, and with a number of countries facing decreasing aid budgets, some of these are considering leaving DRC. This will reinforce those voices in the DRC government that do not want any reform and just want “annoying foreigners” to leave them alone.
Caroline Bahnson, Independent Consultant

Ms Bahnson compared the levels of ambition of the missions in Guinea Bissau and DRC vis-à-vis their achievements. Starting with EUSEC, the defence reform mission in the DRC; there is no overall framework for defence reform in the DRC and no real interest from the Congolese government. EUSEC have done well to concentrate on a technical and pragmatic approach. After several attempts they managed a good job of the census of armed forces then linking that up with the chain of payments system; therefore separating payment from the chain of command.

Secondly, EUPOL supported a more conducive environment for broader reform - as a national coordination authority encompassing government and the international community. They played a key role in the beginning helping to compose some of the documents and legal frameworks for reform, but found themselves struggling to define a role for themselves once key concepts had been developed. EUPOL got dragged into the issue over member states and their role in how some of these issues are formulated. They have a contested new mandate and within a twelve month time period, with forty-nine staff members, they are claiming to be able to “re-establish the population’s confidence in the judicial sector.” That is a very ambitious criteria for success and they are setting themselves up for failure.

One of the key problems for EU-SSR Guinea Bissau is the role of the military in politics. The challenge goes way beyond more technical solutions into resource mobilisation, training, etc. When they started there was a sense of expectation that this was a chance to support the government to develop a national strategy. Just nineteen advisors underestimates the problems faced by the country.

Ms. Bahnson also compared the ambitions and allocated resources for missions. All of the missions were technical. The majority of staff were military, police or judicial. Heads of mission were either military or police. Across all missions there was a huge issue of getting staff hired and keeping them fully deployed. For EUPOL, because they looked more at reform aspects, it was a huge challenge for the EU to identify capable staff - not just good policemen, but police who understood reform. The same problems existed to a greater extent with EU-SSR because it was extremely political. There were no governance or public reform experts. It was a very technical approach to something that required a lot more.

National ownership is an issue that requires more than just rhetoric, more than the Guinea Bissau government saying that SSR is important. Another
important issue is that of funding. All three missions were technical assistance missions and came in without any funding secured, with the rationale that they were bringing wisdom. Overall it becomes a problem to remain at the table if you do not have funding.

A key issue is to look at the ESDP mission as a European project. It is not based on EC majority rules. The agenda is driven by member states and what is on their plate. There is a tendency to do things in a lop-sided manner, with the EU deciding to take action on an issue, but the chain somehow stopping short there. There is an arrogance that the ESDP side has to get to grips with. The issue of feasibility needs to be examined closely in relation to resources and political commitment on both sides. Most of the focus is on deployment and not results-based. Very poor monitoring and evaluation of these missions exists to see whether they are having the desired impact or whether they fit the national environment. There is a risk to the EU’s reputation by putting missions in place without giving them the capacity to fulfill their goals.

**Q&A**

In the question and answer session attendees questioned where EU SSR efforts had been successful and what would constitute a successful end state for SSR. It was alleged that there was a failure at the level of Brussels to understand SSR and a failure of political support from Brussels for technical SSR missions. It was reiterated that even within the government of DRC there is a failure to properly coordinate and that civil servants need to be paid if progress is to be made. Other attendees raised the question of the emerging role of the CPLP in Guinea Bissau and its relations with ECOWAS, and the capacity of the state in Guinea Bissau to engage with UNSSR was questioned.

**Hans Hoebeke:** The international contact group on the DRC, an informal meeting of major players chaired by Holland, launched a mapping exercise as to who was doing what on SSR. There is a growing disparity between headquarters in Europe and Africa and the embassies and missions on how to deal with the DRC government. Building the capacity of the state is a problem when dealing with a government that over the last four years has done everything to avoid doing so. On an end state for SSR it is about the awareness by governments and public actors that they have to make informed decisions on security issues based on threat levels. It doesn’t consist of ten thousand troops or five thousand policemen. It is about the
methodology of how the government and society deals with its threat environment and acts appropriately.

**Ambassador Joseph Mutaboba:** Coordination should be at two levels. One is among national partners; the second is among international partners. SSR does not only concern the realm of defence but encompasses a much broader form: justice, the police and many other areas. Once this occurs, the international partners must coordinate together. Ownership is a principle that must guide SSR. Working in a country like Guinea Bissau with an attitude that you are the expert and they must listen to you will not get you far. ECOWAS is coming together with the CPLP. The main issue is to provide a pension fund to the military. They see that the international community cannot continue to entertain crisis after crisis because of money problems. As chair of CPLP, Angola’s practical answer is to provide the €35million needed to fill the budget gap. With strong will this trilateral partnership between Angola and ECOWAS could be the solution for Guinea Bissau but they have to be coordinated. There are shifting opportunistic alliances: a complex network of people within the military, politics and civil society. This is a small group, fifty to a hundred people and because of military control civilian oversight is not possible in the Guinea Bissau.

**Caroline Bahnson:** There is very little political will in the DRC and no one is trying to put heads together. There is engagement on the institutional level although the DRC’s institutions do not work the way they should. It is all about personality and financial interest.
Session 4: Lessons from East and Central Africa

Chair: Kwesi Sansculotte-Greenidge, ACCORD

General Patrick Nash, Former Operation Commander EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic

The evolution of EU policy in Africa has been affected by two factors. The first is the influence of NATO, which has focussed on the nature and purpose of military power in the region, especially terror and nuclear threats. The second has been more of a case-by-case approach. This divergence in policy is a result of competing ideas about the purpose of EU involvement in African security, such as defending European states from potential terror threats, or pursuing more humanitarian ideals.

Such ambiguous motivations help produce vague mandates, often resulting in stakeholders having diverging expectations and mini-crises breaking out. Generally, these can only be resolved by the interference of major powers and the realisation by such powers that compromising on non-essential issues will be necessary. Generally, however, General Nash indicated he had a positive experience of the EU in African missions.

There are three main areas that are being addressed by the EU in African countries: security, good governance, and economic development. While working on the mission in Chad/CAR, there were four key areas that EUFOR focussed on. The first of these was security of all stakeholders in the region, including humanitarian workers and EU citizens. A second factor in this work was establishing and maintaining good logistics, such as airport infrastructure and supply routes. EUFOR also tried to make regular visits to all major political actors. Gen. Nash emphasised the importance of perception management. This involved establishing media operations to allow overseas press the opportunity to witness firsthand what was happening in Chad/CAR.

There were also challenges involved in this mission. It was important for EUFOR to remain neutral and it had to learn how to refuse offers that would threaten its own neutrality without humiliating the parties involved. At times it was difficult to persuade African heads of state and other key stakeholder groups that EUFOR was not interested in economic incentives. There is a need for major nations to take on the logistics of African missions to ensure that they are effective, since such bridging operations are expensive.
Colonel John Steed, United Nations Political Office for Somalia (on Behalf of Ambassador Mahiga UNSRSG for Somalia)

Somalia has had no proper government for two decades, having suffered natural disasters, conflict, and political crisis. The only constant in this turmoil is the Djibouti Agreement; the roadmap to stability and peace.

The key actors in the Somalia crisis are both internal and external. Of special mention internally is Somaliland, which recently successfully completed a peaceful democratic transfer of power. Contrasting Somaliland is Puntland, a precarious region with significant human rights and piracy issues. Problems in this region need to be addressed now to avoid the situation becoming worse. There are a range of smaller and growing regional powers who are establishing local security and administrations.

The UN is leading the political process and is working closely with the Africa Union (AU) whose mandate for peace-keeping in the country led to the formation of AMISOM. There is also the regional organisation IGAD. Neighbouring states, especially Ethiopia and Kenya, have security and economic interests in Somalia, while the international community is concerned with the perceived threat of terrorism and regional instability.

There are some key political issues that must be solved before the transitional government comes to an end in August 2011. A Somali constitution, highlighted in the Djibouti Agreement, is one such issue. Outreach work to people who have been previously sidelined is the best way of making the constitution sustainable. This does involve negotiating with extremists, although al-Shabaab is perhaps too far. Institution-making is another core task to be addressed before the transitional government comes to an end. This will involve tackling issues such as the fact that ministers do not have any ministries and that there is currently no continuity between governments.

The Colonel argued that the EU’s involvement in Somalia’s security has been ineffective. While it has provided training for the TFG in Uganda, there has been no effort so far to build an infrastructure to support troops within the country, which has led to defections. Realising this, AMISOM troops are now being prioritized by the EU. While remaining neutral, their mission, outlined in the Djibouti Agreement, is to protect the government and air and sea routes. However, systems of funding for AMISOM remain complex and are never guaranteed.
Winrich Kühne, School of Advance International Studies, Bologna Center, Johns Hopkins University

With regard to African security, Winrich emphasised that there are developments outside EU-AU relations that affect the nature of the relationship more. In fact, EU military operations in Africa are a relatively new phenomenon. Operation Artemis in the DRC in 2003 was significant in that it was an EU-backed mission, although the military force was predominantly French.

EU missions in Africa are influenced far more by global politics than military interests. For example, the French influence in Operation Artemis was framed by the post-Iraq relationship between France and the USA, rather than having anything to do with DRC itself. Again, Germany primarily became involved in the DRC in 2006 in order to boost ESDP within global politics. It seems unlikely that the EU would ever intervene in African security without the backing of the ‘big three’ – France, Germany, and the UK.

In the current climate, Afghanistan is the predominant issue within EU security discussions. This affects the way in which the EU will intervene in Africa. In addition, the full extent of the economic crisis has not yet been realised on EU security and defence policy overseas, although it seems very likely that the current public spending cuts in the UK, France, and Germany will reduce EU involvement in African security. At the same time, there are two EU battle groups who are always on standby but never seem to do anything.

Colonel Festus Aboagye, Institute for Strategic Studies

The EU involvement in African security has taken two forms: capacity-building and bridging operations. Capacity-building involves technical support and financial aid, while bridging operations have generally been short-term missions. This a template that the EU has applied to many different security issues within Africa, notably DRC and Chad. However, applying the same template to Somalia will not work.

Instead, in Somalia there needs to be a range of new political options which should include working with al-Shabaab. To exclude them further will lead to greater radicalisation. Somalia is a country with no national ownership, and while the TFG is being supported by the EU, among others, it lacks sustainable authority. Al-Shabaab on the other hand, has a measure of legitimacy within the country. This, in itself, is a reason to engage with al-Shabaab.
The colonel argued that the EU has double-standards for Africa compared to other areas of conflict in the world. While the EU has refused to give Somaliland the legitimacy it deserves through recognising it formally, closer to Europe, the EU has upheld the legitimacy of Kosovo by Balkanising former Yugoslavia.

Q&A

Attendees asked about the inclusion of all parties in negotiations including Al Shabaab. One participant said that the successes of Puntland and Somaliland may have resulted from extensive reconciliation processes and from limited foreign involvement. In South-Central Somalia, the international community’s involvement has excluded several actors. Others raised questions about the operationalization of AMISOM and the role of Ethiopia. If AMISOM’s mandate is to prop up the TFG, then AMISOM’s future is complicated. Would increasing the size of AMISOM make a difference? An attendee asked whether the unique approach of the EUFOR Chad/CAR deployment, had succeeded in practice. Another argued that Somalia will not be stable until Ethiopia removes its troops from Somalia.

Colonel Steed: Reconciliation is a major part of the process, as is outreach to many of those parties that were not part of the Djibouti agreement. The government negotiated in Djibouti comes to an end next August, which is why the outreach aspect of the constitutional development is important. Puntland and Somaliland need to be part of this process, and they are also at risk of being exposed to extremism. Security sector reform is equally as important in these two areas, as it is to South Central Somalia. UNPOS, the EU, and IGAD, are looking at security sector reform issue. AMISOM is a neutral organization with a limited mission: to protect the humanitarian air and sea routes to Somalia, and to protect the government that was negotiated in Djibouti. AMISOM needs to grow. The TFG has not properly developed its own forces and the security sector reform program has not been successful. National ownership of the process of enhancing security is important. The TFG has ownership of the process and it co-chairs the joint security committee with the UN and the AU. The TGF has told the EU they wish to see forces trained internally, which is difficult for external providers.

Colonel Aboagye: A difficulty in finding durable peace in Somalia has been the international community’s insistence on labeling the conflict in Somalia as terrorism. Ethiopia finds resonance with the terrorism issue and has claimed
the right, with the blessing of the US, to enter Somalia any time it wants. Eritrea has responded similarly and Somalia has become a proxy theatre of war. The US should rein in Ethiopia. The National Security and Stabilization Plan has three legs: a governance leg, a developmental leg, and a security leg. Development has been taking place but governance is lacking due to the weaknesses of the TFG. EU efforts should also promote good governance.

**General Nash:** In the Eastern Chad border with Sudan, there are a quarter of a million IDPs, and a quarter of a million refugees from Darfur. The IDPs moved when their towns were pillaged by the Janjaweed. The threat analysis saw the north-eastern corner of the CAR as one of the main avenues of approach of these rebel groups. The President of the CAR welcomed the increase in troops in the area. EUFOR also put in a Level-2 hospital into the town of Birau, the first of its kind in the area. In that part of the CAR, the Janjaweed were not just coming in for political reasons, but they were also in the business of killing elephants for the ivory: EUFOR helped in curbing this.

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Session 5: Regional Implementation of APSA

Chair: Nanna Hvidt, Director, Danish Institute for International Studies

Brigadier General Pal Martins, Executive Director, Pax Africa

General Martins commented on post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), especially in regards to the SADC region. SADC has no operational capacity for cascading down AU policy on reconstruction and development. General Martins said the responsibility falls on South Africa to implement the continental policy that was adopted in Banjul in 2006 as it is the only country with the capacity to engage in PCRD. South Africa chairs the AU PCRD committee that focuses on the DRC and Sudan. AU Policy took 12 months to develop from conception to adoption, a very short period of time. South Africa championed that particular policy at the AU. When a country is prepared to take the lead, as in the case of South Africa, policies get traction.

South Africa has long been involved in the DRC, from the days when Mandela started negotiations with Kabila and Mobuto in a South African ship off the coast of the DRC, to a recent contribution of 200 million rand, as well as military contributions, to guarantee free and fair elections. Many different government departments are involved in the DRC. South Africa has also appointed special envoys to the Great Lakes region, serving as mediator and helping with peace building.

It is not productive for 3 or 4 countries to deal with SSR in 1 country, as each will have a very different approach. Even if all participating mean well, coordinating between so many actors creates potential for wasting money and resources. The problems in the DRC do not only come from external actors, but from the DRC government itself. It is important for the AU and the RECs to put pressure on the government.

South Africa and European countries carry out modest efforts to secure peace in Sudan so trilateral cooperation is very important.

Dr. Kwesi Aning, Director of Research, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

It is Africans themselves who should pay for peace in the continent. In recent years, the AU has begun to listen more to what the RECs are saying, and the RECs have learnt to push harder. There has been improved synergy between
the AU and RECs partly because of the creation and establishment of the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and of the African Standby Force. The process of establishing these two entities has helped improve coordination between the actors, as has the Panel of the Wise (POW) and the Peace and Security Council. Further, the RECs have appointed liaison officers in Addis Ababa.

Although the PSC makes decisions in Addis, it has little ability to get actors to comply. Although the RECs are the building blocks of the AU, the relationships between them are weak. A country can belong to several regional groups, which complicates relationships between the RECs, as each REC tends to move at a different speed. There are, however, some encouraging signs; ECOWAS and ECAS are collaborating on issues of piracy and human trafficking.

But unless member countries pay their fees, the sustainability of these projects is dubious. ECOWAS raises money from its member states, which tax 1% on all exports. Through this ECOWAS generates about 80% of its funding. The other RECs need to find ways to pay for what needs to be done. By having its own funding, organizations like ECOWAS are able to talk with a more authoritative voice.

The third topic was the importance of partnerships and coherence in policies. It is important to question to what extent the framework of APSA is coherent. It is important to think about interdependence. There are several African countries that have had successful SSR processes, even if no one wants to acknowledge it. The Peace Facility and the UN Capacity Building Programme are good. But these partnerships raise concerns about sustainability, predictability and ownership.

RECs have had difficulties but they have been playing a useful role. It is necessary to therefore wait before passing judgment. Furthermore, it is important to remember that no European country is going to put up troops for Africa, so using RECs may be the only option. In conclusion, he emphasized the need for the RECs to build on each other, and to share advice and experience.
Conference Summary: Ensuring Peace and Security in Africa

Dr. Martin Rupiya, Executive Director, African Public Policy and Research Institute

It is necessary to understand the EU/AU partnership in the context of the post-Cold War era, where relations between African states have become more sensitive. Although SSR is also about economic recovery, institution building and social engineering, at its core SSR deals with the military.

Dr. Rupiya focused on SADC as a case study to evaluate peace and security. SADC began in 1999 by pulling together the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. It looked both at social issues and at security. In 2004, it launched SIPO (Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security) to create a peaceful and secure environment in Southern Africa and adjoining regions.

The AU does not ignore state security, but this also brings into question the issue of human security. On new areas for cooperation, the first is sub-regional maritime security, and linking maritime security to human security. For example, is it possible to use South African naval assets to move grain across the Indian Ocean? The second is related to food security. The Danish are already looking to the future, by offering cash to countries of Africa that are producing surplus, and moving the surplus to areas that have a food deficit. The third area he suggested is energy and power generation, where regional cooperation might be the way forward.

There are three unheralded challenges. The first is that not much work has been done on researching the impact of the global recession on peace and security in Africa. The second challenge is looking at the potential of social democratic movements winning elections and getting liberation movements out of office. This brings to the forefront the question of how to understand and provide support to emerging democracies, by challenging the monarchs and creating a middle class. The third challenge is to understand global warming in the regional environment.

Q&A

The EU-Africa relationship may sustain the political stalemate in Africa supporting bad leaders; the AU itself is unwilling to challenge these situations. The example of France expelling the Roma and how the EU was successful in indicting a strong state within the EU (France) for its treatment of minorities was seen as positive. Why hasn’t the AU, which is aligned to the EU, had that same debate on similar issues? The problems associated with multiple REC memberships were raised and questions were asked about the role of North
Africa in APSA. One participant asked if President Bashir should be arrested if he travelled to Kenya and others asked why peacekeeping had been unsuccessful in Somalia. The problematic issues surrounding the role of regional powers in operation in their neighbourhoods was also raised.

El Ghassim Wane, Head, Department of Peace and Security, AU Commission: The relationship between the RECs is a complex and old one. The OAU’s first council of ministers took place in 1963 and was devoted to the relationship between OAU and regional groupings. There has been more progress than people acknowledge. In the PSC protocol there is a provision dealing with the relationship between the AU and RECs. Also there is a provision for the conclusion of an MOU between them and the RECs, which was done in January 2008.

One of the positive effects of the Africa Peace Facility was to strengthen relations between the EU and the RECs. For RECs to access the APF they must be endorsed by the AU. RECs want the AU to speak on their behalf in relation to the EU. All RECs, with the exception of North Africa, are about to open offices in Addis, and hopefully next year RECs will have offices in each others’ bases. However there were coordination problems between the AU and SADC in relation to Madagascar last year. There are also problems with the issue of unconstitutional changes of government. The AU has set itself very high standards in terms of coups. But the RECs haven’t done that.

Dr. Kwesi Aning: Dr. Aning pointed out that the decision on President Bashir sends a signal either way: when African countries signed up to the AU they made a commitment to ensure that genocide would not happen again. There are troubling things happening in the continent, but the AU has not acted. It is unlikely there will be more troops sent into Somalia. In 2006 there was a lot of arm-twisting going on in order to allow Ethiopia to intervene.

The AU needs to have a hierarchy of potential actions that it can respond to. There needs to be accountability with regards to coups. Fighting to expand democratic space in African countries is a very dangerous business. People engaged in these pursuits need to have an exit strategy. Making and sustaining peace and security is also an intellectual challenge. Although achieving peace is important, it is also important to ask who started the conflict.

Brigadier General Pal Martins: There is no normalcy in the Congo when there is massive rape of hundreds of thousands of women. After a recent visit to the Eastern DRC Gen Martins said that neighbouring states like Uganda and Rwanda are perpetuating the conflict. Al-Bashir does not go to countries
like South Africa because he knows that they would arrest him although realistically most African countries will not arrest him, even if it is the morally right thing to do.

In terms of lead nations in regional conflicts, there is no hard and fast rule. It worked in the case of South Africa due to the country’s resources and will. However, South Africa cannot intervene in every conflict in the region and in neighbouring regions. Other countries could take a leading role, such as Kenya or Nigeria because of their clout on peace and security issues. There is a case to be made about strong states taking a lead in peacekeeping in the region.

**Ambassador Shinkaiye**, Chief of Staff, Bureau of the Chairperson, AU: The AU brought Kabila and Kagame together; it is probably not known that changes were not just a result of pressure from Western countries, but from also from interventions by the AU. The same thing happened in relation to Côte d’Ivoire. In the case of Niger, the AU did everything that it could and worked closely with ECOWAS. The AU warned Tandja that if he continued, it would result in a military coup. When democratic reversals occur, it is important to look at causes and reactions.

**Martin Rupiya**: On the issue of North Africa, the expectations are different than for sub-Saharan Africa. Arab countries come to the African Union when they need votes for something, but will ignore the AU the rest of the time.
Session 6: External Perspectives

Chair: Gianni Bonvicini, Executive Vice President, Instituto Affari Internazionali

Chin-Hao Huang, Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

China is quickly adapting to changing realities on the ground and learning that foreign and security policy driven by self interest is problematic in the medium to long term. In large part attributed to increasing interaction; image concerns and a desire to maximise back-patting are factoring in more and more importantly in Chinese thinking. Concepts such as human rights, good governance and accountability are slowly entering the Chinese foreign policy calculus in Africa and will increasingly shape Chinese foreign policy options in the continent. Beijing appears to be more attuned to the sensitivities and regional complexities in Africa.

The likelihood of the Chinese expanding peacekeeping initiatives in Africa will continue, with serious implications for peace and security on the continent. The Chinese also have experience in food security, having lifted 300 million of its people out of food poverty, a lot of that done through the development of agriculture. Some of these lessons can be used in the African context. The Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce are encouraging Chinese agricultural firms to expand their trade investment, providing cost-effective fertilisers and seeds to help boost development in Africa. Food security is a critical aspect of peace and security for the Chinese, along with health security. These are less sensitive areas of policy but areas where the Chinese and global partners, such as the USA, can work strategically together.

China’s expanding military, political, and economic ties need to be better managed to complement overall Chinese efforts in the region. UN officials in DRC are expressing some concern at the lack of transparency of the very extensive bilateral ties between the two and this is replicated in Sudan, Liberia and Chad. Chinese goodwill that has been built up in the region will be increasingly tested and undermined by other activities of the government.

For China, domestic concerns, the economic crisis and the degree to which the Chinese population will want to focus externally when there are so many issues to improve on domestically will all play a part in how China moves forward on Africa. There is potential for more substantive dialogue. The onus
is on Africa to push China, in particular when there is broad consensus and buy in from African states on issues such as good governance, human rights and accountability. The Chinese will respond to the emerging consensus from Africa.

**Shirin Pakfar, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations**

The relationship between the UN and EU is defined under Chapter 8 of the UN charter, which explains that while the UN has the primary responsibility for peace and security, regional organizations can act on behalf of the UN. At the UN Security Council / AU PSC level, the two bodies have started a dialogue and have met yearly for the past 4 years.

At the same time, the UN Secretariat works together with the AUC at the country-specific level and between the two headquarters to ensure that there is agreement – as much as possible – on analysis and the way forward on a certain conflict. The partnership between the UN and AU in peace and security is rooted in the 2006 Ten Year Capacity Building Programme. A UN office to the AU was recently established, led by an Assistant Secretary General and have established a Joint Task Force that meets every 6 months to discuss issues of strategic importance.

After the Rwandan genocide, the AU decided that it cannot depend any longer on the UN for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The AU and the sub-regional organizations have undertaken many operations. They acted in Darfur before joining with the UN for the hybrid mission in Darfur; UNAMID. The AU deployed in Somalia and after 18 months of operations the UNSC authorized a UN logistics support package to help sustain the mission.

In addition to the UN's peacekeeping partnership in Darfur and Somalia, the UN and AU work well together on the issue of the North-South conflict in Sudan, and the UN mission in Sudan works with the AU High Level Panel led by President Mbeki. UNDPKO is also working to draw lessons and best practices from the Darfur and Somalia experiences.

Fundamentally for the AU, its ability to mount peacekeeping operations is constrained by a lack of predictable, sustainable and flexible funding. The AU has been able to sustain operations in Darfur and Somalia mainly through the EU's financial support and the UN's logistics support. The Prodi report suggested that the UNSC should finance AU peacekeeping operations authorized by the Security Council for 6 months, on a case by case basis and when it has been decided to be ‘re-hatted’ by the UN. Since the AU believes
that it is working on behalf of the UN when it undertakes peacekeeping operations, its member states argue that the UN should use its assessed contributions to finance operations.

SC member states are not ready to give the AU blanket authorization for financing peacekeeping operations. They argue that the UN does not pay for EU peacekeeping operations on behalf of the UN. They want to maintain control and to emphasize the primacy of the SC. Some argue that this type of control is no longer relevant, as Africa begins to take more responsibility for its own conflicts. Some argue that the only true source of predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for the AU comes from Africa. Is peacekeeping the comparative advantage of the AU? Is the AU trying to do too much under the APSA? The UN secretariat is trying to refine its strategic vision with respect to the AU in peace and security.

**El Ghassim Wane, Head, Department of Peace and Security, African Union Commission**

APSA should be understood not only as a set of institutions, but also as a set of norms relating to peace and security, be it governance, corruption, democracy, human rights or border issues. Most of the AU’s principles and policies, such as on democracy, human rights and good governance were already either adopted or were in the process of being adopted by the OAU, which started on peace and security issues on the 1990s. It is important to recognize that the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa was very far reaching.

Africa today is completely different from thirty years ago. More specifically, the AU had the APSA protocol of 2003. Seven years down the line the AU has achieved a functioning Peace and Security Council (PSC) which meets regularly, and makes far reaching decisions, such as on Côte d’Ivoire and Madagascar. There is a continental early warning system that is in place from a technical point of view. On the ASF, most of the policy documents are in place. However the AU Commission is powerful by default not by design. Analytical capacity is lacking in the early warning system - there is no point collecting information when you cannot convert it into an intelligent analysis and concrete solutions. The AU has yet to get the ASF deployed on the ground to see what exactly it needs. The Panel of the Wise (PoW) is not active operationally in dealing with actual situations of crisis. For the AU today the challenge is no longer of policy formulation, but of policy implementation. What is necessary, with AU partners, is to put in place the shift to help people on the ground.
Africa needs to be seen for its complexities. Africa bashing is a tendency and yet there is not enough effort to do proper research. It is predetermined that the AU is useless without studying it before carrying out work. There is no way to sustain APSA if funding is not predictable and flexible. So far, peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are mainly funded from outside Africa. The Commission is making efforts to address this issue by getting assessed contributions from the UNSC, on the grounds that by deploying in Sudan, Somalia or Burundi, it is doing so on behalf of peace and security in the international community and the UNSC. The Commission is not making much progress with this but it is a point on which it will persist.

The AU used to have yearly meetings with the G8 but these have stopped and they must be revived. The Commission will also try to establish the idea of a complementary peace fund for its bilateral partners. Fundamentally, the AU needs to get money from within to ensure the sustainably of funding for its PKOs. If AU member states were financially burdened they would be more accountable for the outcomes. Otherwise there is a risk of perpetuating the current situation of financial accountability and political unaccountability. At present their responsibility stops at approving the mission, without monitoring evaluation, follow-up and political will to challenge us on short-comings. If the AU were paying for it it would be pressed hard to make progress on issues such as Somalia.

Africa needs ownership, African solutions and standards. When Africans are making sustained efforts to deal with a problem, the AU expects its partners to help it to implement African policies on peacekeeping challenges. The PSC is an organization that must be treated seriously by the UN. The UNSC must adjust itself to the new realities of the world or risk becoming irrelevant. The AU's partnership with the EU has great potential but the politics must be brought back and the bureaucracy lessened.

**Q&A**

Attendees questioned if China could help on peace and security issues when it does not uphold the same principles on intervention and unconstitutional changes of government. On the subject of ownership, it was asked who the real beneficiaries of AMISOM are. The issue of AFRICOM and its role was raised: it was said that General Ward, the head of AFRICOM, seeks to point out the role for AFRICOM is based on African demands, not a US agenda. The main caveat is that the US has security interests in Africa and US
involvement exists where US interests and African desires intersect. It was asked if it was possible to see concrete achievements following the doubling of the AUC budget and if the AU recognised the need to devolve power and initiative to the RECs.

**Chin-Hao Huang:** China is a staunch defender of sovereignty and has done a lot to deflect criticism from its own human rights record. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident is an excellent case in point. It is possible that China is a bad example for African countries: a regime that is increasingly capable of double-digit economic growth rates but yet maintaining a solid grip on power. A larger point is that China is on a steep learning curve in terms of its relationship with Africa. The Chinese, in the early 2000s, probably thought they could get away with a lot of these things whereas now they are accepting that human rights, good governance, and accountability are norms that have been accepted and internalised by the AU, RECs and certain African states themselves. The Chinese are learning from this partnership and the hope is that they will pick up from their African partners how to deal with these issues. Whether or not they are signing up to a responsible stakeholder image, the Chinese will be increasingly scrutinized and will begin to see their own interests align with their global partners. If they want to be a responsible power then contravening strict laws on arms sales will not work and although it will be a long drawn out process, Africa can help the Chinese forge their status as a responsible global partner. You can indeed raise these difficult issues and disagree with China without being disagreeable. Not raising these issues at all gets China off the hook and makes them think these are not important issues.

**El Ghassim Wane:** China contributed a lot to getting the hybrid operation instigated in Sudan. They have one of the most sophisticated influences over Sudan and the AU value them.

The AU has, thanks to the EU, all the technical aspects for the early warning system in place but it does not have analysts who can make use of the information. The recruitment process and dissemination of funding from AU partners is slow. In reference to AU member states and funding, ownership will always be questioned unless it can get funding from within. You ask harder questions when you pay for it. The AU budget is divided into two, the operational budget for salaries and utilities and the programme budget. Unfortunately, most of the programme budget is still funded by AU partners.
There is no doubt that an increase of funding for the AU Commission makes it easier for it to be more active on the ground, especially in conflict areas.

There is a role for AFRICOM because there is a role for the US, which is a very big player and the AU Commission has a yearly dialogue with the US.

Somalis own Somalia, this is clear. The AU has no intention of replacing the Somalis. AU policy may not be perfect but the intention is to help. There are many players involved: the AU, IGAD, EU, UN, bilateral partners and the Somali Diaspora, which at times plays a positive role, at others very negative. The deployment of AMISOM was and is a positive step and the AU intends on staying. There is a possibility of extending the size and strength of the force and it is doing a lot of humanitarian work on the ground. It provides three thousand people with medical care every week and more than sixty thousand with water. The Commission wishes it could do more and there is a need for the mission to be accepted by the Somali people. It is better to have a strong AMISOM on the ground than not at all, or having to deal with others.

**Ambassador John Shinkaiye:** There is a strategic relationship between the AU Commission and China. In the FOCAC process, up until last month, the AU had an observer status but from this month it has become a full participant and it is hoped it will contribute fully with the AU’s continental relevance. In the AU relationship with China the Commission does raise the issues of governance, human rights and democracy in the dialogue. Chinese participation in UNAMID was a direct result of this dialogue.

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Session 7: Framework for the Future of the EU Africa Relationship

Chair: Ticky Monekosso, Executive Director, Afromedianet - The African Media Partnership

Ms Monekosso addressed the different nature of security issues between Europe and Africa and the relevance that African security has for global security and solidarity. The title of the session could be extended to include the matter of security and international companies, such as in the DRC where reports have indicated that companies may have armed groups, which links into the need to address the arms trade. She also mentioned ‘tied financial aid’ from the EU, among other donors.

Xavier Ejoyi, Institute of Security Studies

There are similarities and differences between the EU and the AU. EU-African relations are not a new phenomenon in relation to security and will inevitably be shaped by precedent. There are four issues that need to be addressed when marrying security and foreign policy, which Mr. Eljoyi collectively calls, ‘minding the gaps’.

The first issue is that of ownership and its meaning to Africans. An important sign of progress on this front is that Africans have clearer aims than ever before. It is important to emphasize that ownership does not only refer to money and funding.

Broadening participation is another key gap that needs to be addressed. Private companies, whether supporting peace or conflict, should be included in EU efforts to address African security. The case of the Niger Delta highlights this concern. However, participation should also be extended to include the less conventional aspects of civil society in order to engage African people, rather than just NGOs.

Complementing partnerships between Africa and the EU, along with other key groups, such as China and the UN, should be more carefully considered. There is a need to look closely at the African-EU relationship and ask whether it is just an expression of Chapter Eight of the UN Framework, or something more complementary.
The final point comes back to the issue of the balance-sheet and there is a need for the EU to express more clearly what it needs from the partnership.

**Nicoletta Pirozzi, Istituto Affari Internazionali**

Ms. Pirozzi presented on the outcomes of a study she conducted on the relationship between the EU and Africa.

Security was one of the most successful outcomes of the joint EU-AU strategy (JAES). The JAES and Action Plan helped create a political dialogue on security between the EU and AU through information exchange and analysis. There was also the establishment of funding through the African Peace Facility, at the request of African leaders. This was limited in scope, in terms of its restriction of use of funds for military activities, and of who is able to deploy funds. The Instrument for Stability is another source of funding used to for counter-terrorism work and for preventing drug trafficking, among other initiatives.

Coordination and transparency within the EU are major issues. Member states within the EU are reluctant to share information about their bilateral involvement in African security. Ms. Pirozzi stressed the need to make the discrepancies between these bilateral actions and the multilateral nature of the EU-Africa partnership more coherent.

Ms. Pirozzi's recommendations focussed on the need to go beyond APSA. There should be more focus on early warning analysis and creating new spaces for civil society involvement. APSA should also be transformed from a capability-development exercise into something that can be implemented in an operational manner. A 2020 Africa-EU partnership which has achievable goals and a new consultation mechanism is needed.

**Damien Helly, EU institute for Security Studies**

It seems that the EU will be criticised whatever line it chooses to take in African security. If it provides military action to support African peace then it will be accused of neo-colonialism, and if not, it will be criticised for refusing to help. Giving money may be regarded as a form of manipulation, but no funding could signal disengagement.

It is evident that simply giving money is not enough. However, working more closely together also creates challenges, especially in the varying structures of African and EU institutions. Mr. Helly also argued that the EU is too
bureaucratic and that there is a need for more decisions to be taken on the ground, even if these involve a degree of political risk. He questioned whether the EU should be engaging more with strong African actors and posed the question of whether supporting an African G8 may help to reinvigorate the rest of the continent.

The EU strategic outlook on African security issues remains predominantly the same as it was in 2008. There are the former colonial powers that have experience and a degree of cynicism on the matter, which contrasts to the idealism of the Nordic member states. Those who joined the EU after 2004 have little interest in Africa.

There has been no discussion of how the reform of the UN Security Council will affect the EU-Africa relationship. This is especially since there has been little internal debate within the EU as to what they want to get out of the reforms. Once this has happened, the role of China in Africa will become clearer, since the UK and France as members of the Security Council act as interlocutors between China and the US.

Sudan is another issue that has to be addressed. There needs to be a strong EU special representative there, perhaps filled by British expertise. Mr. Helly also flagged the issue of the LRA and requested that there be an urgent response by the EU.

Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Former UN SRSG for Somalia

The Ambassador observed that there had been a communication break-down between the EU and the AU. Different media sources in the EU and in Africa have resulted in fewer people reading from the same script. The Ambassador argues that this needs to be addressed.

He highlighted the fact that African commentators are obsessed with the role that China is playing on the continent. Yet this is not a new phenomenon. In the early 1970s the Tazara railway was built entirely by the Chinese. Countries such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Brazil are new actors in the region and their presence marks the end of an era with Britain and France. The Ambassador also doubts that there will be many trilateral EU-China-Africa agreements, reasoning that China prefers to do business directly.

In reference to marrying security and foreign policy the Ambassador argued that all governments have a mandate to ensure the security of their people, and in this way there is no foreign policy that is not based on security. There is also a need to define better what security means, since migration to the EU
from Africa might spell a potential threat in the perceptions of EU member states, but a source of income for those in Africa.

Threats to security have evolved over time, and so should the policies of European and African states. This relationship has evolved from predominantly bilateral agreements into multilateral ones with the advent of the EU-Africa partnership. However, there are some problems with the current relationship. The EU spends too long on analysing situations. Longevity is also an issue when it comes to the time between announcing and delivering on policies, especially when these involve funding. The way in which money is directed to different actors means that it is not being spent effectively enough.

The Ambassador emphasised that there has been too much of a focus on peacekeeping. This alone is not enough since all it does is contain the crisis and does little to prevent or resolve the situation.

**Q&A**

It was argued that it may be useful if the EU collaborates with the AU more on civilian conflict prevention, as opposed to focusing largely on justice. It was also argued that in the short-term, the EU wants Africa to address problems that also affect Europe, such as terrorism, climate change, and poverty. In the long term, the EU wants to create a global partnership with Africa, where both regions can work together given their particular strengths and weaknesses.

It was also mentioned that EU member states are involved in the drafting of a plan of action. It is important to note that involvement of the member states varies, which can be expected, as some member states have a greater interest in particular areas than others. There has been deep internal reflection in relation to what could be done better. The overall engagement of the EU has not changed, but the shape the engagement takes has been changing.

It was mentioned that the EU has at times been too ambitious, such as with the first plan of action. As a result their subsequent plans have had a more pragmatic angle, and have been focused on establishing outcomes that can be delivered. There has been extensive consultation on both the African and the European sides. The EU is now also trying to integrate civil society and the private sector into the activities related to the summit. The EU will always be criticized for doing too much or too little. Having policies without mission is
much better than having missions without policy. It is important to check whether a model of action is working.

It was suggested that patterns of conflicts have remained unchanged because root causes have not been addressed. There is donor fatigue and Africa needs to be proactive in how it addresses this fatigue and in looking for alternative sources of funding. Further, the important thing is not the quantity of the money but how it is used.
### ANNEX A: ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia; January 2007 - present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARTEMIS</td>
<td>EU-led military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo; June 2003 – September 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP</td>
<td>Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa</td>
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<td>EUSEC</td>
<td>European Union Security Sector Reform DRC 2005-present</td>
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<td>EUSSR</td>
<td>EU Security Sector Reform in Guinea Bissau 2008-2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission to the DRC 1999-2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC; originally MONUC; mandate until June 30, 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSSP</td>
<td>National Security and Stabilization Plan</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>POW</td>
<td>Panel of the Wise</td>
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<td>RECs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (SADC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNOGBIS</td>
<td>Union Mission in Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSRSG</td>
<td>United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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</table>